the sole legitimate government in the South. At a maximum, the GVN might simply refuse to participate at all, perhaps at the last minute. This is obviously a delicate problem which will require early, effective representations by us to the GVN. In doing so, we will have to make perfectly clear that we will not support any GVN efforts to adjust the PRG's status as a full participant in the Conference since such maneuvers, or the GVN's refusal to participate, would be viewed as a major treaty violation and could risk undermining the entire Agreement. We should point out that acceptance of the fact that military control of the territory of South Viet-Nam is divided between the GVN and the PRG is a basic element of the Agreement, but that it in no way implies acceptance of the legitimacy of the PRG1s claims to be a lawful government. If the GVN still does not cooperate on this issue, we should be prepared to use whatever pressures that are necessary to induce agreement.

Our preference for conference chairman is UN Secretary General Waldheim. The Vietnamese Communists are likely to resist this, hovtver, in virw of their aversion to UN involvement in Indochinese affairs. They will probably propose that Trance, as the host country, chair the Conference. Such an arrangement (presumably with Foreign Minister Schuj ann in the chair) would not be in our interest and we should reject it ostensibly on the grounds that it would be inappropriate for the Conference to be chaired by a party which is both an active participant in the Conference and a representative of a government with declared political policies toward Viet-Nam. This would effectively exclude all participants other than the UN Secretary General from the chairmanship. Waldheim's role at the Conference would be limited to that of presiding officer, with no substantive functions.