Submarines of U.S. Stage Spy Missions Inside SovietWaters BY SEYMOUR M.HERSH Special to The Newyork Times WASHINGTON, May 24—For nearly 15 years, the Navy has been using specially equipped electronic submarines to spy at .times inside the three-mile limit of the Soviet Union and other nations. The highly classified missions, code-named Holystone, have been credited by supporters with supplying vital information on the configuration, capabilities, noise patterns and m;ssile-iiring abilities of the Soviet submarine fleet. It is not known how many men and submarines have been involved In the underseas spying, but at one point in the early seventies, at least four such ships were known to be m operation. Concern About Detente Critics of the program, who include past and present members of the National Security Council, the State Department, the Navy and the Central Intelligence Agency, contend that much of the inteligence gathered by the submarines can be (obtained through other means, I such as satellites, which are far less provocative and less vulnerable to Soviet interception. The critics also question whether such intelligence operations have any place in the current atmosphere of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. Many of the critics acknowledged that they had agreed to discuss the operation in the hope of forcing changes in how intelligence was collected and utilized by the Government. All the sources agreed that I the Soviet Union was aware > of the Holystone program, although perhaps not specifically of when and where the boats I were on patrol. Adding to the objections to the missions raised by the critics, according to high-level Government particials interviewed, has been the number of accidents and near-misses involving the submarines, such as the following: Two known collision with Soviet submarines. The grounding—and eventual escape of a Holystone submarine within the three mile limit off .the east coast of the Soviet Union. The accidental sinking of a North Vietnamese mine sweeper by a submarine on " patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam war. The damaging of a Holy - stone submarine that surfaced underneath a Soviet ship in the midst of a Soviet fleet naval exercise. Despite a search by the Soviet vessels, the submarine, which suffered damage; to its conning tower, escaped. Question of Control Furthermore, many former officials say that the Holystone program Taises questions about the Government's over-all intelligence reconnaissance programs and their control, which thus far do not seem to be a major factor in the Congressional select committees investigation of intelligence, operations. It could not be learned how often penetration inside the three-mile limit was made, nor could it be learned whether such penetration needed special clearance. All the sources greed, however, that Holystone missions had repeatedly violated the territorial waters of the Soviet Union and other nations. One source said that the submarines were able to plug into Soviet land communication cables strewn across the ocean bottom and thus were able to Intercept high - level military Messages and other communications considered too important to be sent by radio or other less secure means. As outlined by the sources, Holystone was authorized in the early nineteen-sixties, and its reconnaissance operations were placed by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara under the direct control of the Chief of Naval Operations, the f6ur-star admiral who heads the Navy. At various times during me Vietnam war officials in Washington reportedly delegated responsibility for missions to the. Navy admiral in charge of Pacific operations. Pueblo Selrume Control over the program was apparently tightened after North Korea seized the United States spy ship Pueblo in 1968, sources said, and the schedule of Holystone missions now have to be approved every month by the 40 Committee, the high-level intelligence review panel headed by Secretary of State Kissinger. Navy sources familiar with, the program said that Holystone involved a minimum of cost because the Navy utilized nuclear-powered basic attack submarines of the Sturgeon, or 637 Class, and simply added more electronic gear and a special unit from the National Security Agency to turn the attack submarine into a reconnaissance vessel. The National Security Agence of with headquarters at Fort Meade, Md., near Washington, serves as the major source for intelligence and interception communications. It also is in of developing unbreak id cod electronic mission-and breaking the codes of other nations. A highly secret N.S.A. unit was aboard the Pueblo when it was capped. Inside the Navy, the Holy-tone patrols are considered a source of pride; Pentagon official recalled that the Mavy Warded clearances for the operation and that official knowledge of it outside the service was limited to a few high-ranking civilians. No Sign of Office The program still is under.; the direct control of the naval intelligence command and is ,known as OPPO 099U inside Navy. There is no sign of that office in the published, pentagon telephone directory, nor is its chief operational officer, Capt. Jack B. Richard, list- The sensitivity of the program is dramatized by the fact that the Navy has set up a separate channel for recruiting the seamen for the Holystone missions, according to men involved in the recruiting, The recruiting, much of which reportedly carried out at overseas Navy bases, is considered so sensitive that the candidates are not permitted to I know exactly what they are I being asked to do. Special tests are administered, including extensive psychiatric testing*, be-'fore a seaman is judged qualified, sources said. As of a few years ago, an intelligence summary of the program was made available every Thursday in the Chief of Naval Operations briefing theater on the fouth floor of the Pentagon. One participant recalled that the Holystone missions were discuessed after the regulart intelligence briefing for hight-ranking admiral and the top Navy civillian officals. The lights were dimmed and' slides were utilized to show where the missions were on, station, the source said. Photographs Shown The participant recalled seeing close-up photographs of Soviet submarines that had been taken by a Holystone vessel. At that meeting, which took place. in the early the Navy officially briefed the program as if the Soviet Union had not detected any of its Holystone missions, the source said. In numerous interviews, however, many Government officials described that belief as inconceivable, particularly in view of the known accidents involving Holystone vessels and Soviet submarines. One former Goverment official recalled that the Navy once turned down an interrgence commendation the Holystone operation be publicly disclosed. The argument was that the Navy had nothing to lose because the program was well known to high officials in the United Stages and Soviet Union land because some Government lawyers said that it was at least arguable that the operation was in accord with international law and thus was legal. The Navy declined the suggestion, the official said, in what was interpreted to be I an admission that not all the Holystone operations could I stand up to public scrutiny. Briefing Recalled One former Government intelligence official recalled a Hollystone briefing in the mid-sixties in which he and others were shown photographs of the underside of an E-Class Soviet submarine that appeared to be taken inside Vladisvostok harbor, a main Soviet submarine port. "On that same mission," the official recalled, "the Holystone submarine scraped the bottom of one of the E-Class submarines and knocked off some of its equipment" He recalled that someone asked during the briefing whether that had been the only such incident, and was told "No. It's happened at least two other times."