

ARVN forces or a significant further increase in Communist strength beyond that of the past week, the GVN should be able to hold the situation in MR 3 about as it stood on 3 April, at least for the immediate future.

In the Mekong Delta (MR 4), the past several weeks have not seen any appreciable change. Opposing regular combat forces are about evenly matched [(See Tables, Tabs B & C).] The tactical situation could deteriorate rapidly if additional Communist units come into the area or if the GVN should redeploy to MR 3 any one of the three ARVN divisions now assigned to MR 4. X

Militarily, the GVN is on the defensive and beleaguered. March's military reverses and their attendant consequences--the loss of territory, military and civilian casualties, and the enormous population dislocation of the more than two million civilian refugees--have had a heavy, adverse impact on the whole political and social structure of South Vietnam. Just how heavy, extensive or lasting is hard to tell, partly because the South Vietnamese people are in a state of shock and because a full knowledge of what actually has happened in MR's 1 and 2 is not yet widespread, even in Saigon, let alone the populated rural areas in MR 3 or the still prosperous and agriculturally busy Mekong Delta.

C. North Vietnamese Plans and Intentions

North Vietnam's intentions are hard to discern and its next moves are probably the subject of active discussion now being conducted by the Lao Dong Politburo in Hanoi. Such evidence as is available suggests that Hanoi is weighing two broad options:

- a. Exert a maximum effort to exploit the recent tactical successes and present battlefield advantage of the North Vietnamese Army in an all out effort to collapse the GVN and eliminate it as a functioning political entity.
- b. Consolidate recent gains and try for one or two more major victories (e.g., disperse the 25th ARVN Division and/or capture Tay Ninh), then call for negotiations on terms tantamount to a GVN surrender, planning to try again for military victory later in 1975 or 1976 if the GVN can not be pressured politically into accepting some form of "coalition government" that would give the Communists de facto political control over South Vietnam.

From the time the Paris Agreement was signed in 1973, Hanoi has been steadily improving its military capabilities in South Vietnam through a continuous improvement of its logistic infrastructure (roads, trails, depots, etc., in both Laos and South Vietnam) and a continuous infusion of supplies, equipment and troops--all in direct violation of Article 7 of the 1973 Agreement. This flow has peaked and valleyed over the past 26 months, but it has never stopped.

